The Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that a prospective juror with actual bias, such as an opinion that the defendant is guilty, is qualified to serve on a jury as long as gives an unequivocal assurance she can be fair and impartial (People v Nicholas, 98 NY2d 749, 751 [2002]; People v Arnold, 96 NY2d 358, 362 [2001]; People v Johnson, 94 NY2d 600, 614 [2000]).
The rule is different with respect to a prospective juror who is said to have an “implied bias” based on a preexisting relationship with a potential witness that “is likely to preclude her from rendering an impartial verdict. ” Unlike actual bias, implied bias, requires automatic exclusion from jury service regardless of whether the prospective juror declares that the relationship will not affect her ability to be fair and impartial (see e.g. People v Branch, 46 NY2d 645, 650 [1979]; People v Rentz, 67 NY2d 829, 831 [1986]). And such bias, whether acknowledged by the declarant or not, cannot be cured with an expurgatory oath.
In People v Furey, __NY3d__, 2011 NY Slip Op 09000 (12/15/11) , the Court of Appeals again applied this rule and reversed a conviction where a challenge for cause was denied with respect to a prospective juror with implied bias. In Furey, after noting that not all relationships qualify for this implied bias rule and that the “frequency of contact and nature of the parties’ relationship are to be considered in determining whether disqualification is necessary” the Court held that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a challenge for cause where the prospective juror’s husband was a police captain who has assigned the detective who investigated the case and
she knew eight of the witnesses (seven police officers and an assistant district attorney) who were to testify at trial — more than half of the People’s potential witnesses — and had frequent professional and social relationships with at least two of the police officers. Although [the prospective juror] offered unequivocal assurances of impartiality, those declarations were ineffective in a case like this because there was a considerable risk that she could unwittingly give undue credence to the witnesses she knew and her service would give rise to the perception that defendant did not receive a fair trial.
